Air defense can help, but may be smarter with full deployment of capabilities

opinions

The war in Ukraine leaves room for consideration of how to best manage our defensive struggle.

Three observations from the invasion of Ukraine provide the basis for future revision of professional military posture assessments. First: condemnation by other countries of aggressive wars.

Then the constant need to avoid nuclear war.

Finally, how powerful new weapons technology is in shaping the evolution of warfare.

condemnation of harmony

Western democracies almost unanimously condemned the invasion of Ukraine and were very willing to impose economic sanctions on Russia and support Ukraine. Hopefully we can count on similar support for our country in the event of an invasion.

This can provide expanded opportunities to lead the defensive struggle from nearby allied countries

Russia’s increasing ability to launch long-range precision weapons is mentioned in the Open Electronic Service Threat Assessment from 2021. One should note the crushing missile attack on Ukrainian military facilities and imagine the consequences for an individual’s combat capability if aircraft, naval ships, ammunition, fuel stocks and personnel are deployed the basics. From early games during the invasion.

Air defense can remedy something, but is probably smarter with full deployment of capabilities where such a move makes sense, before/during a potential attack. Then the military operations continue from another place where the attack does not continue.

Defense against invasion

Additionally, we can note that it appears to be morally preferable internationally to defend oneself against an invading counterpart. Such a narrative should be sought rather than risk being portrayed as the aggressive party.

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The deployment of strategic bombers and US forces on Norwegian soil could act like this and be used for propaganda purposes. The reasoning that this acts as a deterrent and is therefore an appropriate method must be reconsidered.

This deterrence strategy may be unwise. If foreign military and civilians are withdrawn from Norway in the event of an imminent attack, the great powers themselves do not want to escalate.

This also eliminates the deterrent effect one might expect.

In Ukraine, foreign employees were either evacuated or advised to leave the country. Of course, it may be that the deployed army will be left in Norway before the attack, but we can hardly control such a situation ourselves. Regardless of what may be stated in bilateral agreements and declarations of intent, there is therefore no complete guarantee.

under attack

In terms of weapons technology, one sees in almost real time on user uploaded videos from Ukraine how hand anti-tank weapons, anti-aircraft guns and drones are being used against both armored vehicles and aircraft to great effect.

Logistical hubs along the route and toward airports in Ukraine are highly vulnerable to attack using this relatively inexpensive weapon technology. A similar threat can be created here at home against hubs and logistics points on sea, land and air by small ships, off-road vehicles or snowmobiles.

Such small and scattered threats, for example, pose anti-aircraft guns, the gaseous counterpart has few opportunities to control or stop the flow. This may be an explanation for why Large parts of the Russian Air Force are parked on the ground.

Thin staffing plans can be another matter.

Prone to losing employees

The Air Force’s ability to conduct complex air operations as the opponent tries to shoot you down requires experienced personnel. The ability and willingness to continue the war, as well as in the medium term to reproduce new crews of complex weapons systems, is also eroding unpredictably quickly when key personnel are killed or captured.

This reinforces the argument as to why special combat systems are better used than foreign bases to avoid them ending up in a similar situation – because power on the part of personnel increases.

There is also potential here to see how remotely launched missiles from low-signature platforms can inflict significant losses on an invading force without fully understanding their origin or ability to respond directly to an attack.

defense from outside

It’s not a new or strange idea in a defensive battle with Norwegian forces abroad, but a potential intermediate case in a larger war scenario. It was last seen when Norwegian squadrons and special forces carried out operations against Germans from abroad during World War II.

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The prerequisites for such a war have increased in our time with new tactical deployment methods, longer ranges of weapons and sensors, air-to-air refueling and stealth capability to name a few.

Finally, operational security has grown in importance.

It may have immediate consequences

The security classification of classified military information is often formulated as “information that can substantially damage a country’s relations with other countries”. This relationship can be damaged more quickly by the pace of news spread today via the Internet and social media.

If individual nations carry out covert operations, we see how the revelation can have immediate consequences for whether or not the conflict escalates.

Active Western participation in Ukraine’s war with the armed forces could provide a pretext for a continuation of the war or Russian escalation. The corresponding protection requirements for confidential information of operations in invaded Norway apply to other countries, if they wish to avoid escalation.

In light of the Ukraine war, other nations’ reactions to the conflict, the impact of new weapons technology, as well as the continuing need to avoid nuclear war, provide scope for a reassessment of how our defensive conflict should best be conducted.